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STATE COURT LITIGATION: THE NEW FRONT IN 
THE WAR AGAINST PARTISAN 
GERRYMANDERING 
Charlie Stewart* 
INTRODUCTION 
Partisan gerrymandering is the process of drafting state and congressional 
districts in a manner that gives one political party an advantage over another.1 
The end goal is simple: help your party win more seats or protect existing 
ones.2 The tactic is as old as the United States.3 In 1788, Patrick Henry 
convinced the Virginia state legislature to draw the 5th Congressional District 
to pit his rival James Madison against James Monroe.4 The term 
“gerrymander” itself is a hybrid: in 1810, democratic Governor Gerry signed a 
partisan redistricting plan into law—one that contained a district that 
infamously looked like a salamander.5 
The opposition Federalist party and the press seized on the oddly shaped 
district and Governor Gerry was defeated in 1812, although the Democrats 
ultimately retained control of the state legislature.6 Despite governor Gerry’s 
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 1. Christopher Ingraham, This is the Best Explanation of Gerrymandering You Will 
Ever See, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Mar. 1, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/01/this-is-the-best-explanation-of-
gerrymandering-you-will-ever-see/?utm_term=.fb58852415ca [https://perma.cc/T2J8-F7AY]. 
 2. Andrew Prokop, Gerrymandering, Explained: What is Gerrymandering?, VOX.COM 
(May 15, 2015, 2:57 PM), https://www.vox.com/cards/gerrymandering-explained/what-is-
gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/AR8P-YE4S]. 
 3. Emily Barasch, The Twisted History of Gerrymandering in American Politics, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-twisted-
history-of-gerrymandering-in-american-politics/262369/ [https://perma.cc/6YSP-8JTP]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Prokop, supra note 2. 
 6. Id. Although the Federalists won an overwhelming majority of the popular vote in 
the next election and took control. Id. 
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other impressive achievements (including signing the Declaration of 
Independence), “gerrymandering” is his enduring claim to fame.7 
But it was not until 1842 that gerrymandering took full effect. Due to the 
Apportionment Act of 1842, states were required to apportion themselves into 
congressional districts based on population and number of representatives.8 
Previously, states were permitted (and many did) elect their representatives 
on an at-large basis—a system that allowed the winning party in a statewide 
election to elect all of their representatives without districts.9 This change 
placed incredible importance on the redistricting process, one traditionally 
controlled by the state legislature.10 
Through this long history of partisan gerrymandering in the United 
States, the Supreme Court rarely intervened.11 The political nature of 
districting12 and the lack of a judicially manageable solution (how much 
gerrymandering is too much?) has made the Court wary of imposing strict 
guidelines or overturning a map drawn by a democratically elected 
legislature.13 As long as a district conforms to a few basic criteria, it will likely 
survive a constitutional challenge.14 Congressional districts must be 
continuous (i.e. cannot be split into multiple parts), must contain around the 
same number of people, and must not be drawn because of racial animus 
(violating the Voting Rights Act). If voting maps satisfy those criteria, history 
tells us a partisan gerrymander will likely pass Supreme Court scrutiny.15 
The most common types of partisan gerrymandering are packing and 
cracking.16 Packing is a technique to “pack” as many voters of an opposition 
party into as few districts as possible.17 This limits the influence of the 
opposition party, as many of their voters are confined to a few safe districts.18 
The other party then spreads its own voters out enough to achieve a safe 
majority in as many districts as possible.19 By contrast, cracking involves 
breaking the supporters of a rival party into as many districts as possible.20 
This dilutes their voting strength and makes it easier for the party in power to 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Barasch, supra note 3. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Prokop, supra note 2. 
 11. Carrie Arnold, The Mathematicians Who Want to Save Democracy, SCI. AM. (June 7, 
2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-mathematicians-who-want-to-save-
democracy/ [https://perma.cc/D94D-F5HZ]. 
 12. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 13. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 14. Arnold, supra note 11. 
 15. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267; see also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740–41 (1983). 
 16. See Arnold, supra note 11. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. 
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remain in power.21 Although these techniques are almost as old as the country 
itself, the problem has been exacerbated by the use of computers.22 While 
previous gerrymanders required drawing the maps by hand, computer 
programs can now mathematically optimize districting maps to maximize the 
effects of a partisan gerrymander.23 
Parties on both sides of the political spectrum commit acts of partisan 
gerrymandering.24 For example, Maryland, a Democratic stronghold, has one 
of the most gerrymandered congressional districts in the country.25 Drawn by 
state Democrats in 2012, the map was designed to achieve two goals: eliminate 
the two Republican districts and ensure Democrat incumbents victory in the 
next five elections.26 Although the end goal of incumbency protection 
prevented Democrats from achieving their goal of an 8–0 seat advantage, they 
still achieved incumbent protection and a 7–1 advantage (a pick-up of one seat 
from the previous map).27 The resulting map contains some of the ugliest and 
most gerrymandered districts in America today.28 
For example, prior to the 2012 redistricting, Maryland’s sixth 
congressional district contained 208,024 registered Republicans and 159,715 
Democrats.29 But after the 2012 redistricting plan, the sixth contained 145,620 
Republicans to 192,820 Democrats.30 The 10-term Republican incumbent lost 
by over 20% in the 2012 election.31 Another district, Maryland’s third, is often 
described as a praying mantis.32 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See Nina Totenberg, Partisan Gerrymandering: How Much Is Too Much?, NPR (Oct. 
3, 2017, 4:50 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/03/555425809/supreme-court-set-to-
consider-partisan-gerrymandering (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 24. Christopher Ingraham, America’s Most Gerrymandered Congressional Districts, 
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (May 15, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/05/15/americas-most-gerrymandered-
congressional-districts/?utm_term=.1cd75f04b202 [https://perma.cc/NM2P-5YU7]; see also 
Dave Daley, How Democrats Gerrymandered Their Way to Victory in Maryland, ATLANTIC 
(June 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/how-deep-blue-
maryland-shows-redistricting-is-broken/531492/ [https://perma.cc/S66G-5URW]. Although it 
currently appears Republicans are committing the most egregious and damaging examples of 
partisan gerrymandering. Stephen Wolf, No, Maryland is Not the Most Gerrymandered State, 
There is More to Gerrymandering than Ugly Shapes, DAILY KOS (June 1, 2016, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2016/6/1/1532608/-No-Maryland-is-not-the-most-
gerrymandered-state-There-is-more-to-gerrymandering-than-ugly-shapes 
[https://perma.cc/RTG9-TXWV]. 
 25. Ingraham, supra note 24; see also Daley, supra note 24. But see Wolf, supra note 24. 
 26. Daley, supra note 24. Districts are drawn every ten years. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Ingraham, supra note 24. 
 29. Daley, supra note 24. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Ingraham, supra note 24. 
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A myriad of challenges to partisan gerrymandering have emerged in 
recent years. These range from grassroots campaigns for an independent 
redistricting to constitutional challenges in federal court. A recent case from 
Pennsylvania, however, presents a new solution to this problem. The plaintiffs 
in League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania General 
Assembly33 brought a state constitutional challenge, instead of a federal one, 
thus allowing them to bypass unfavorable precedent in the federal system34 
and gain relief under state law35 that is unreviewable by the Supreme Court.36 
By doing so, the plaintiffs created a new method of attack against partisan 
gerrymandering. 
This Essay evaluates the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in 
League of Women Voters and concludes it creates a new, effective front in the 
war against partisan gerrymandering—one that is insulated from Supreme 
Court review. Part I examines methods already tried to combat partisan 
gerrymandering and concludes another option is sorely needed due to 
deficiencies in those methods. Part II evaluates the strategy behind League of 
Women Voters, discusses the advantage of insulation from Supreme Court 
review, and argues it represents a new, broadly applicable strategy for fighting 
partisan gerrymandering. This Essay concludes by discussing how this 
approach is applicable to other gerrymandered states. 
I. CURRENT TACTICS AND THEIR DEFICIENCIES 
Activists around the country have tried a variety of methods to combat 
partisan gerrymandering. These methods range from traditional litigation in 
federal courts to passing a state constitutional amendment mandating fair 
districts. Some of these methods have been relatively successful, while others 
are effectively unusable, at least for the time being. But even the successful 
methods have limitations. This Part briefly examines these already-deployed 
tactics, and concludes a new strategy is needed to continue the war on partisan 
gerrymandering. 
A. Federal Litigation 
The current outlook in federal court for partisan gerrymandering activists 
is bleak.37 Although federal litigation gets the most attention from the media 
 
 33. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth of Pa., 175 A.3d 282, 282 (Pa. 2018) 
(mem.). 
 34. See infra Part I.A. 
 35. The decision is notable because the plaintiffs did not allege a violation of an equal 
districting amendment, but instead alleged violations of existing Pennsylvania state law. 
 36. See infra Part II. 
 37. There are several other cases involving gerrymandering percolating around the 
federal system, but they are mostly racial gerrymandering cases (as opposed to partisan 
gerrymandering) or involve the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 
(2017); Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 49 (2017) (mem.). 
156 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 116:152 
 
 
and legal scholarship,38 recent case law effectively precludes a federal 
challenge.39 In Vieth v. Jubelirer, a plurality of the Supreme Court held partisan 
gerrymandering to not be justiciable.40 The plurality believed the Court could 
never agree on one single magic “formula” or standard for determining and 
eliminating gerrymandered districts.41 Indeed, and to the plurality’s credit, 
four dissenting justices advocated for the use of three different tests.42 Justice 
Scalia believed party affiliation, unlike race, was not an immutable 
characteristic.43 Vieth effectively precludes most federal litigation challenging 
a partisan gerrymander.44 
One major partisan gerrymandering case, Gill v. Whitford, is currently 
pending before the Supreme Court.45 The plaintiffs in Gill presented a 
repeatable mathematical formula for determining the severity of partisan 
gerrymandering for a given electoral map. But the likely outcome is murky.46 
It is unclear whether the respondents’ proposed formula is justiciable enough 
for Justice Kennedy. As this Essay goes to publication, the Court is still 
deliberating Gill. Since Justice Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts are the only 
two justices who have not yet written an opinion from the October term 
(when Gill was argued), it is believed one of them is authoring the majority 
opinion.47 Regardless, federal litigation is currently an unlikely route to 
success. 
 
 38. See Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 
(2016). 
 39. Gill v. Whitford has the potential to change this, but it’s unclear how the Court will 
decide. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) 
(mem.). 
 40. 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004). 
 41. Id. at 296–97. 
 42. Id. at 292. 
 43. Id. at 287. 
 44. Racial gerrymandering is still unconstitutional, however. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 
478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 45. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017). 
 46. Id. at 845. There is one other partisan gerrymandering case the Court heard during 
the current term, further complicating the issue: Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 543 (2017) 
(mem.). During oral argument for Benisek, the justices on the Court seemed as perplexed as 
ever, with Justice Breyer even suggesting the Court should combine Gill with Benisek and a 
third partisan gerrymandering case to be heard next term. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court, Again 
Weighing Map Warped by Politics, Shows No Consensus, N.Y. TIMES (March 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/us/politics/supreme-court-elections-gerrymander.html 
(on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 47. Kimberly Robinson (@KimberlyRobinson), TWITTER (May 21, 2018, 6:23 AM), 
https://twitter.com/KimberlyRobinsn/status/998554897569210368 [https://perma.cc/NU4C-
3AF4]. It is unclear what this means for the Court’s opinion. 
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B. State Constitutional Amendments 
Another method of combatting partisan gerrymandering is a grassroots 
campaign to pass a state constitutional amendment by referendum.48 These 
amendments typically forbid legislatures from using partisan motivations 
when redistricting or vest redistricting power in a bipartisan or independent 
commission.49 The Supreme Court in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission narrowly held such amendments to be 
constitutional.50 These amendments also appear to work. States with 
independent and bipartisan commissions have significantly fewer 
gerrymandered congressional districts.51 For example, Arizona and Iowa, 
which have either a bipartisan or independent redistricting committees 
ranked 14th and 11th respectively for most compact districts in a recent 
study.52 
But these tactics also have downsides. State legislatures rarely want to 
voluntarily relinquish power. For example, despite the passage of the Fair 
Districts Amendment to the Florida Constitution (which forbade redistricting 
with any partisan intent) the Florida legislature still committed a partisan 
gerrymander in the 2012 redistricting.53 It took until 2015—after significant 
litigation—for the Florida Supreme Court to declare aspects of the 2012 
redistricting unconstitutional under Florida law.54 The Florida Supreme Court 
in League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner, however, only found specific 
districts to be in violation—not the entire map.55 The Court also refused to 
draw a new map on its own, instead sending the problem back to the 
legislature for further consideration, adding more delays to an already 
arduous process.56 
 
 48. See Richard L. Hasen, Essay, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: 
A Sharp Right Turn but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1628–
29 (2016). This allows activists to avoid the recalcitrant state legislature. Id. 
 49. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 
(2015); see also Jordan Lewis, Note, Fair Districts Florida: A Meaningful Redistricting Reform?, 
5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 189, 192 (2015) (“[S]ix [states] use wholly independent 
commissions consisting of individuals who are not public servants, and five states implement 
the commission model only if the legislature fails to produce a constitutionally adequate map 
in time.”). California, Washington, and Florida have constitutional amendments limiting 
partisan motivations in redistricting. Id. at 202 n.26. 
 50. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct at 2659. 
 51. See Arnold, supra note 11. 
 52. Id.; AZAVEA, REDRAWING THE MAP ON REDISTRICTING 2012 (2012), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.azavea.com/com.redistrictingthenation/pdfs/Redistricting_The_
Nation_Addendum.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6D3-UX5W]. 
 53. League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 370 (Fla. 2015). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. at 370–72 (finding violations of the Fair District Amendment and not 
broader constitutional violations (either federal or state)). 
 56. Id. at 413–15. 
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The grassroots process is also slow, often requiring a referendum,57 which 
involves gathering hundreds of thousands of signatures before even appearing 
on a ballot. Even if the amendment passes, it may still be years before the next 
redistricting—allowing the party that committed the partisan gerrymander to 
continue to reap the fruits of their misdeeds.58 
II. STATE LITIGATION—A NEW TACTIC 
All of the methods described in Part I have deficiencies. They are either 
currently precluded or slow and unpredictable. These limitations create a need 
for an additional method to attack partisan gerrymandering. This Part argues 
that state court litigation is that new additional method. This Part examines 
the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, League of Women Voters, and 
concludes it creates an effective new strategy in the war against partisan 
gerrymandering due to the potentially positive results, the speed with which 
it takes place, broad applicability,59 and its insulation from Supreme Court 
review. This Part also discusses the various advantages of state court litigation 
that are available activists in other states plagued by partisan gerrymandering. 
A. League of Women Voters 
The plaintiffs in League of Women Voters60 took an unconventional 
approach to combatting partisan gerrymandering. Rather than alleging 
violations of the federal constitution61 or trying to pass a state constitutional 
amendment, the plaintiffs instead argued the partisan gerrymander violated 
current provisions of the state constitution. Specifically, they alleged violation 
of the Free Expression and Association Clause (Art. I §§ 7, 20), Equal 
Protection Guarantees (Art. I, §§ 1, 26), and the Free and Equal Clause (Art. 
I, § 5) of the Pennsylvania state constitution.62 The complaint also asked for 
 
 57. See Jackie Borchardt, Ohio Redistricting Advocates Oppose Republican Lawmakers’ 
Plan, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 22, 2018, 3:20 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2018/01/ohio_redistricting_advocates_o.html 
[https://perma.cc/TSZ7-LUPX]. For example, Ohio’s new, theoretically less gerrymandered 
electoral map will not go into effect until 20222. See Ohio House Districts 2012-2022, The Ohio 
House of Representatives, http://www.ohiohouse.gov/members/district-map 
[https://perma.cc/V9QL-CWYZ]. 
 58. See Borchardt, supra note 57. 
 59. As many states have similar provisions of their constitutions. See Joseph 
Blocher, What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the Federal Constitution, 115 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 1035, 1037–38 (2011). 
 60. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 174 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2018). 
 61. Different plaintiffs in Pennsylvania tried this tactic, but a district court panel upheld 
the map 2-1. Cristiano Lima, Supreme Court to Hear Texas Case on Racial Gerrymandering, 
POLITICO (Jan. 12, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/12/supreme-
court-texas-racial-gerrymandering-338733 [https://perma.cc/D42W-GEV2]. 
 62. League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania General Assembly, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/league-
women-voters-v-pennslyvania [https://perma.cc/5GA3-HKPN] [hereinafter BRENNAN CTR.]. 
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an injunction preventing the Pennsylvania legislature from considering 
political data when redistricting.63 Unlike Detzner, the case from Florida 
detailed in Part I, the plaintiffs in League of Women Voters argued the 
gerrymandered districts violated state constitutional provisions similar to 
ones in the federal Constitution—rather than a specific amendment that 
prohibited partisan gerrymandering like Florida’s Fair District Amendment.64 
After an expedited and contentious litigation process,65 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court handed down an unsigned order on January 22, 2018 striking 
down the Republican drawn map.66 A lengthy opinion followed on February 
7, 2018.67 The Court’s opinion created a template for future state courts to 
craft a similar standard and proceeded in four steps. First, the Court held a 
claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution’s free and clear elections clause68 
should be adjudicated under a different standard than the federal equal 
protection clause.69 This clever move freed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
to escape unfavorable federal precedent, such as Vieth.70 It also, as discussed 
below in Section II.C, further insulated the decision from Supreme Court 
review. 
Second, the Court found that a partisan gerrymander claim provides a 
legally cognizable basis for challenging redistricting under the free and clear 
elections clause.71 These two moves—severing the interpretation of the state 
constitution from the federal one and recognizing a partisan gerrymandering 
claim under state law—created a new standard to evaluate a partisan 
gerrymandering claim. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court essentially wrote 
with a clean slate. 
Third, the Court applied the facts of League of Women Voters to their 
articulated standard. The Court found the Republican created map 
“deprive[d] [voters] of their state constitutional right to free and equal 
elections.”72 In making this determination, the Court relied on expert 
testimony and statistical analysis.73 The 2011 Republican map was a classic 
example of “packing” as it “effectively serve[d] to establish a few 
overwhelmingly Democratic districts and a large majority of less strong, but 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d at 370 (Fla. 2015). 
 65. BRENNAN CTR., supra note 62. 
 66. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 174 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018). 
 67. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018). 
 68. PENN. CONST. art. I, §  5. 
 69. Previous precedent in Pennsylvania indicated that the Pennsylvania Free and Equal 
Elections Clause should be interpreted in the same manner as the federal Equal Protection 
Clause. League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 813(“disavowing” Erfer v. Com., 794 A.2d 325 
(Pa. 2002)). 
 70. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 71. League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 814. 
 72. Id. at 818. 
 73. Id. at 818–19. 
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nevertheless likely Republican districts.”74 The opinion also specifically 
pointed to the “tortuously drawn districts that cause plainly unnecessary 
political-subdivision splits.”75 
Fourth and finally, the Court held “[w]hen . . . the legislature is unable [to 
draw a fair map] or chooses not to act, it becomes the judiciary’s role to 
determine the appropriate redistricting plan.”76 This last move applied 
pressure on the Republican (and any future) legislature. Instead of allowing 
the Republicans to filibuster by drawing constitutionally unacceptable maps, 
the Court instead placed itself as a neutral arbiter that would step in if the 
legislature failed to act properly. 
After some initial opposition by the Republicans (including threatening 
to impeach some of the justices),77 they submitted a proposed new map to the 
governor on February 9th.78 But the new map, at least according to a 
mathematician employed by the governor, was the second most 
gerrymandered redistricting plan that still fit within the constitutional 
requirements.79 The original 2011 Republican plan was first.80 After this 
apparent bad-faith attempt at redistricting, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
assumed control and issued a nonpartisan map (designed by an independent 
professor from Stanford) on February 19, 2018.81 
The ramifications of this case are legion. First, the Court’s proposed map 
more closely approximates the politics of the state, which is solidly purple 
between Republicans and Democrats.82 This could result in a pickup of three 
 
 74. Id. at 820. 
 75. Id. at 819. 
 76. Id. at 822. 
 77. See John Bowden, Toomey Calls for ‘Conversation’ about Impeaching State Supreme 
Court Justices, HILL (Feb. 21, 2018, 11:56 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/state-
watch/374858-toomey-calls-for-conversation-about-impeaching-pennsylvania-supreme 
[https://perma.cc/ZNR3-9H8D]. 
 78. Christopher Ingraham,  
Pennsylvania Republicans Have Drawn A New Congressional Map that is Just as 
Gerrymandered as the Old One, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Feb. 11, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/11/pennsylvania-republicans-have-
drawn-a-new-congressional-map-that-is-just-as-gerrymandered-as-the-old-
one/?utm_term=.f7341d536338 [https://perma.cc/VU9T-G7D6]. 
 79. In other words, the Republican legislature’s new map was second to only the 
previously drawn map in the intensity of its partisan gerrymander. Professor M. Duchin, 
Summary of Conclusions of Joint Submission Plan (2018), https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/20180213-Summary-of-conclusions-of-joint-submission-plan-M.-
Duchin-021318.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TEQ-NGTC]. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Stephen Wolf, Pennsylvania’s Groundbreaking New Congressional Map Isn’t Just 
Nonpartisan—It’s Fair, DAILY KOS (Feb. 19, 2018 9:15 PM), 
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/1742930 [https://perma.cc/JW5W-7NS3]. 
 82. Christopher Ingraham, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Draws ‘Much More 
Competitive’ District Map to Overturn Republican Gerrymander, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG 
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/19/pennsylvania-
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to four seats for the Democrats in the House of Representatives83—a crucial 
number considering control of the House hinges on 24 seats.84 The new map 
is also much more competitive, compact, and splits fewer counties and 
municipal areas.85 In the view of election experts, this map is nonpartisan and 
fair and could serve as an example for other states.86 
Second, the court’s decision presents a new, viable solution to the scourge 
of partisan gerrymandering. The decision is an alternative to litigation in 
federal courts or the slow (and not always successful) grassroots method of a 
constitutional amendment. A sympathetic state supreme court, if it followed 
the Pennsylvania model, could strike down partisan gerrymanders and restore 
voting fairness in a relatively short amount of time.87 Further, if the Supreme 
Court rules against the plaintiffs in Gill, litigation in federal courts may 
become even more difficult.88 Indeed, even if the Court in Gill finds a judicially 
manageable solution to partisan gerrymandering, litigation in state courts is 
nevertheless a useful tool to attack partisan gerrymandering. 
B. Advantages of State Litigation 
One of the most attractive features about the decision in League of Women 
Voters is that it is final and unreviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court.89 The 
Supreme Court’s decision rendering partisan gerrymandering cases 
nonjusticiable in Vieth is not binding on state courts interpreting state law. 
This allows creative plaintiffs in gerrymandered states to craft arguments 
similar to the one in League of Women Voters and get favorable results in a 
more expedited fashion. 
Whether the Supreme Court could ever review a partisan gerrymandering 
case based in state law is a question of federalism and state sovereignty. This 
question is determined by four relevant principles to the question of review of 
state law decisions by the Supreme Court: (1) The Supreme Court has the final 
say with respect to questions of federal law;90 (2) the Supreme Court will not 
review questions of state law;91 (3) if it appears both federal and state law 
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decision are present, the Supreme Court will not review the case if there is an 
adequate and independent state law ground;92 and (4) if the basis for the state 
court’s decision is ambiguous, the Supreme Court will assume the basis is 
federal, permitting review.93 
Applying these principles to the decision in League of Women Voters 
demonstrates how a similar decision in the future would also be insulated 
from review. League of Women Voters is a state court decision about state 
law.94 Thus, the first principle is inapposite and we should instead apply the 
second principle—state courts get the final say on issues of purely state law.95 
Consequently, the decision in League of Women Voters and any similar state 
partisan gerrymandering decision are unreviewable by the Supreme Court. 
To be further insulated from Supreme Court review, the state court must 
also unambiguously base their decision solely in state law. Any ambiguity in 
the state court’s decision opens to the door to review. In League of Women 
Voters, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied unambiguously on state law 
and only state law.96 The Court stated: “[T]he Court finds as a matter of law 
that the Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011 clearly, plainly and palpably 
violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and, on that 
sole basis, we hereby strike it as unconstitutional.”97 This satisfies the fourth 
principle. It is a clear and unambiguous statement that the decision reached is 
solely one of state law. It seems likely that the justices on the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court knowingly added this language to insulate their decision from 
Supreme Court review. Any future state court should make the same explicit 
reference to state law to replicate the same effect. 
But state partisan gerrymandering cases also raise a few questions that 
may push certain pressure points of the doctrine. First, there is the concern 
for undermining federal law and federal rights.98 Although the Supreme Court 
defers to state courts to decide state law, partisan gerrymandering presents a 
special case. The Pennsylvania state court decided an issue under state law 
because federal law is convoluted and inhospitable to partisan 
gerrymandering claims.99 These types of decisions, for all of their merit, are in 
many ways a runaround of federal law due to the holding in Vieth, which held 
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partisan gerrymandering claims to be non-justiciable.100 The Court could view 
this tactic as a sham to escape federal jurisdiction. League of Women Voters 
involved federal redistricting101 and essentially achieved a result unavailable in 
federal court for an almost identical claim.102 If enough plaintiffs took the state 
law route, the Supreme Court could determine federal interests override 
federalism and other concerns, like Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in 
Bush v. Gore.103 But this would be a significant and nearly unprecedented 
invasion of state sovereignty and a slap in the face to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. It is highly unlikely the Court would take such a drastic step. 
Second, there is the possibility that state constitutions are not 
independent enough under the third principle of Supreme Court review of 
state court decisions, which requires the state law grounds to be both adequate 
and independent of federal law to avoid Supreme Court review.104 For 
example, although there are numerous differences between the federal and 
Pennsylvania constitutions, there are also substantial similarities as well. 
Indeed, the first Pennsylvania constitution dates back to 1776.105 And the 
Pennsylvania state bar lists only 46 significant differences between the two 
documents.106 
But considering the wide range of case law divergent between the two 
built up over the last two centuries, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court 
would consider the Pennsylvania’s or other states’ constitution to be parasitic 
on the equal protection clause for voting rights. It would be another 
substantial encroachment by the Supreme Court into areas of state 
sovereignty. And the current composition of the Supreme Court is very 
deferential to the states.107 Further, state courts are not bound by the 
interpretations of similar federal constitutional provisions on state ones.108 
State supreme courts are within their rights in the federalist system to 
interpret their own constitutions. Even considering the wide-ranging impact 
of partisan gerrymandering, such encroachment would again be an 
extraordinarily intrusive step by the Supreme Court. This is likely why Justice 
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Alito simply denied the Republican’s petition for review without 
explanation.109 
Insulation from Supreme Court review allows plaintiffs to avoid 
unfavorable precedent in Vieth and to litigate in potentially friendlier state 
courts. Regardless of the outcome in Gill, litigation in state courts represents 
a new and effective method of fighting partisan gerrymandering. 
CONCLUSION 
State court constitutional litigation on partisan gerrymandering is an 
exciting new strategy. The strategy is broadly applicable. A state court may 
also be more open to novel or new arguments based on esoteric constitutional 
provisions that are unavailable in federal litigation. Litigation in state court 
also has the potential to speed up the agonizingly slow process of passing a 
constitutional amendment and waiting for the next redistricting cycle.110 
Furthermore, two strategies—seeking a state constitutional guarantee and 
state court litigation—could be used in tandem. One group of activists could 
work on the slower, but permanent process of seeking an amendment while 
another group pursues a claim in state court to get more immediate relief. 
There are, of course, limitations to this method. Not all state supreme 
courts will be as open to the idea of overturning districts crafted by the 
legislature. State justices themselves may be swayed by partisan forces from 
their own political parties.111 Indeed, some may even be hostile to the idea. 
Even judges not ideologically opposed to reforming partisan gerrymandering 
may still be wary of usurping a map designed by a (somewhat) democratically 
elected branch of government. 
Regardless of these limitations, League of Women Voters provides a 
repeatable template for activists in other states to fight partisan 
gerrymandering. Depending on the composition of the state court and their 
respectability of the claim, state court litigation could significantly and 
positively alter redistricting to be less partisan and more fair. 
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